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I. Overview
In this report, I discuss how a multilateral agreement on climate change could be
safeguarded against the risk of investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) claims that
target climate change action. The motivation behind the report is to support, and
certainly not to undermine, a multilateral climate change agreement by drawing
attention to the issue of an ISDS carve-out and suggesting detailed and strong
language for a carve-out.
In particular, I propose language for an ISDS carve-out that is informed by past
interpretive approaches of ISDS tribunals, the importance of climate change action,
and the potential deterrent that ISDS creates for governments considering such
action. The suggested carve-out is as follows:
“This Article applies to any measure adopted by a Party to this Agreement and
relating to the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system or relating to any of the principles or
commitments contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change of 1992.
Such a measure shall not be subject to any existing or future treaty of a Party to
the extent that it allows for investor-state dispute settlement unless the treaty
states specifically and precisely, with express reference to this Article and this
Agreement, that this Article is overridden. For greater certainty, in the absence
of such a reference in a future treaty between two or more Parties, the future
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treaty is presumed to include in full and without qualification the first three
paragraphs of this Article.
Any dispute over the scope or application of this Article shall be referred to,
and fall within, the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of [specific body and process
pursuant to the multilateral climate change agreement]. For greater certainty,
no investor-state dispute settlement tribunal, arbitrator, body, or process has
jurisdiction over any dispute related to the scope or application of this Article.
The Parties shall not agree to any future treaty that allows for investor-state
dispute settlement unless the future treaty incorporates in full and without
qualification the language of the first three paragraphs of this Article. The
Parties shall make best efforts to renegotiate any existing treaty with a nonParty that allows for investor-state dispute settlement in order to ensure that
the existing treaty incorporates in full and without qualification the language
of the first three paragraphs of this Article.”
This proposed language is aimed at ensuring a reliable carve-out to protect against
risks of ISDS arbitration claims targeting climate change action. Some terms used in
the carve-out, including “measure” and “investor-state dispute settlement” would
require definition in a multilateral climate change agreement, as discussed below. If
the carve-out were included in a multilateral climate change agreement, it would
apply to all treaties allowing for ISDS among the states parties to that multilateral
agreement.
To support its reliability, any disputes about the scope or application of the carve-out
should be referred to a decision-making body that is established and acts under the
auspices of the multilateral climate change agreement, not an ISDS treaty. This would
avoid the risk of evasive interpretation by ISDS tribunals and allow a forum that has
direct expertise and institutional commitment concerning climate change action to
resolve disputes about the meaning of the carve-out.
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II. Comments
These comments are supported by references to other documents and publications on
ISDS. The citations below are to the author’s publications which in turn include more
detailed discussion and extensive references to relevant data, past ISDS decisions,
and secondary literature.
A. Risks posed by ISDS to climate change action
Faced with risks of uncapped financial liability due to ISDS claims, states may be
deterred from implementing measures to fulfill their climate change responsibilities.
In particular, ISDS poses a risk to climate change measures because:
i.

Multinational companies and wealthy foreign nationals have a unique legal
right and the financial capacity to bring costly ISDS claims against states
without first resorting to domestic courts or tribunals (where they offer justice
and are reasonably available) for violations of foreign investor rights.2 Two
common themes in the hundreds of ISDS cases thus far are disputes in the
resource sector and disputes relating to public health or environmental
protection measures.3

ii.

Foreign investor rights are often stated ambiguously in the treaties that allow
for ISDS. In turn, such rights are subject to broad discretion of ISDS tribunals
to decide issues of state liability.4 In various cases, ISDS tribunals have
interpreted foreign investor rights in ways that require public compensation
for general and public purpose changes to the state’s regulatory framework as
applied indiscriminately to all asset owners.5

G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), 110113.
3 G Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment
Treaty Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2013), 82-89.
4 Van Harten, note 1 above, chapter 4 and 122-124; Van Harten, note 2 above, 45-46.
5 Van Harten, note 2 above, 52-54, 57-61, and 82-89.
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iii.

ISDS arbitrators have broad power over public budgets due to their authority
to award uncapped amounts of compensation to foreign investors.6 States have
no opportunity to avoid liability after the arbitrators issue their decision. Thus,
states may face an incentive to avoid climate change action in order to limit
their potential liability due to ISDS claims.

To safeguard against the risk of ISDS claims that frustrate or deter climate change
action, it is suggested that a multilateral climate change agreement should include a
broad carve-out from all treaties that allow for ISDS arbitration.7
B. Characteristics of a reliable carve-out

1. Application to existing and future treaties that allow for ISDS
For existing ISDS treaties, a carve-out in a multilateral climate change agreement
should be designed as a subsequent legal agreement that would take precedence over
the existing ISDS treaty. That is, the multilateral climate change agreement would be
a subsequent agreement between its Parties to override all of their past treaties
allowing for ISDS in matters subject to the carve-out. The states would be agreeing or
clarifying in the multilateral climate change agreement that their existing consents, if
any, to allow ISDS claims against them simply do not apply to climate change
measures.
For future ISDS treaties, the situation is more complicated. The carve-out from ISDS
in a multilateral climate change agreement would need to be sufficiently specific in its
prioritization of the carve-out over the Parties’ consents to ISDS in any future treaty
allowing for ISDS. The carve-out proposed here aims to achieve this objective by
referring to existing or future treaties and by including a requirement that any other
treaty, in order for it to override the carve-out, must be specific and precise on the
issue and, in particular, must expressly mention the carve-out in the multilateral

Van Harten, note 1 above, 101-109 and 145-149; Van Harten, Note 2 above, 113-114.
The term “measure” should be defined broadly, as it is in many investment treaties, to include “any
law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice”. e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Article 201; proposed Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), Article X.01.
6
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climate change agreement. The aim is not to encourage future overrides of the carveout but rather to preclude evasive interpretations by ISDS tribunals – which have, for
example, regularly avoided exclusive jurisdiction clauses in contracts that appear to
preclude the treaty claim8 – that would defeat the carve-out.
For greater certainty, the carve-out also includes an obligation of each Party to
reproduce the carve-out in any future ISDS treaty and a clarification that any future
ISDS treaty among the Parties is presumed to include the carve-out.
2. Application as between states that are party to the climate change agreement
A carve-out from ISDS would only apply to ISDS treaties between or among states
that are Parties to the multilateral climate change agreement. For example, a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) allowing for ISDS would be covered by the carve-out if both
of the states parties to the BIT were also Parties to the multilateral climate change
agreement. Similarly, a trade or investment treaty that was between more than two
states and that allowed for ISDS (e.g. NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty) would be
covered by the carve-out, albeit only for those states parties to the trade or
investment treaty that were also Parties to the multilateral climate change agreement
and even then only with an important caveat.9
The carve-out would not apply, however, in the case of an ISDS treaty between, on
the one hand, a state that is a Party to the multilateral climate change agreement and,
on the other hand, a state that is not a Party. It would not apply because the ISDS
treaty would not have been overridden by a subsequent agreement between the states
8

Van Harten, note 2 above, 135-147.
The caveat arises from Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This Article raises
a significant prospect that an ISDS tribunal – established under a trade or investment agreement with
more than two states parties, in a situation where at least one of those states parties had not ratified
the multilateral climate change agreement – could decide that the ISDS carve-out did not apply in all
cases brought under the relevant trade or investment agreement (including cases brought by an
investor of a Party to the multilateral climate change agreement against another Party to that
agreement) on the basis that (a) the carve-out affected the rights of the other states parties to the trade
and investment agreement that were not Party to the multilateral climate change agreement or (b) the
carve-out was incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the trade or
investment agreement. This is a significant weakness in the reliability of the proposed ISDS carve-out
for existing trade or investment agreements that have more than two parties. The weakness would be
removed if all three or more states parties to the relevant trade or investment agreement (e.g. NAFTA,
the Energy Charter Treaty) were also Parties to the multilateral climate change agreement and its ISDS
carve-out.
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parties to the ISDS treaty. In light of this weakness, in its fourth paragraph the carve
out establishes binding obligations of the states parties to include the carve out in
future ISDS treaties and to make best efforts to renegotiate any existing ISDS treaty –
with a state that is not a Party to the multilateral climate change agreement – in order
to incorporate the carve-out into the existing treaty. The issue of how to enforce these
negotiating obligations is left open with the expectation that they would become part
of a general enforcement process in the multilateral climate change agreement.
3. Application to the subject matter of climate change
What is meant by “action” or “measures” on climate change? The approach adopted
here is to include any measure linked to the objective, principles, or commitments of
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which states for example:10
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system….”
By drawing on the language of the Framework Convention including the principles
and commitments in Articles 3 and 4, the proposed carve-out is intended to apply to a
wide range of state measures relating to climate change mitigation and adaptation as
characterized ultimately in the Framework Convention, its other provisions and
processes, and related climate change agreements.
4. Connection between the carve-out and climate change action
Government action on climate change can take many forms. The proposed carve-out
has been framed broadly to encompass anticipated and unanticipated measures that
states may adopt and thus to avoid deterring regulatory innovation.

10
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Many existing exceptions in ISDS treaties are unreliable because they use qualified
language. For example, many existing ISDS exceptions apply only to state conduct
that is shown to be “necessary” to achieve a regulatory aim or only where an ISDS
award is shown to “prevent” the state conduct.11 This language creates significant
uncertainty by leaving open the risk of unavoidable liability for the state, at the time
of an ISDS award, if ISDS arbitrators decide that the state could have adopted some
other measure instead of the impugned one or that the state is not prevented from
adopting a measure merely because it must pay compensation for the measure.
To avoid these uncertainties, the broader term “relating to” – used in some
exceptions in ISDS treaties – has been adopted in the carve-out. This language allows
for wider coverage and flexibility, while still putting a limit on wholly unrelated and
thus arbitrary action by states by requiring some connection between the climate
change objective and the measure said to be covered by the carve-out.
5. Application to ISDS
The carve-out applies to any existing or future treaty “to the extent that it allows for
investor-state dispute settlement”. What is meant by “investor-state dispute
settlement”? A multilateral climate change agreement should define this term based
on the language used in existing treaties to establish states’ consents to ISDS. In
particular, the definition could be linked to the types of treaties that typically allow
for ISDS and to the specific rules under which ISDS claims are made.
With this in mind, the following definition is proposed:
“ISDS means any proceeding arising from a claim against a state where the
claim is brought pursuant to (a) a treaty concerning international trade or
foreign investment and (b) any of the following arbitration rules: the ICSID
Convention (also known as the ICSID rules), the ICSID additional facility rules,
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, or any other arbitration rules including any

e.g. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Article 33(2).
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ad hoc arbitration rules and any arbitration rules agreed by the disputing
parties.”
This definition aims to capture all forms of investor-state arbitration proceedings
under trade and investment treaties, but not state-state or non-arbitration
proceedings. Therefore, the carve-out would apply to trade and investment treaties
only to the extent that they give foreign investors the unique right to bring ISDS
claims. Direct state-to-state proceedings and soft forms of ISDS – i.e. mediation or
conciliation – would still be permitted in order to enforce foreign investor rights. It
would be possible but complex, especially for state-to-state proceedings, to broaden
the carve-out so that it applied to such proceedings. The present focus is informed by
the fact that the vast majority of treaty-based ISDS claims have been investor-state
arbitrations.
Also, the definition would capture treaty-based investor-state arbitration but not
investor-state arbitration pursuant to a state’s own legislation or a contract. To
capture these other forms of ISDS, clause (a) would need to be removed.
e. Avoidance of circular language
Some ISDS treaties contain exceptions with circular language that limits or defeats
the exception. For example, an exception may be limited to measures said to be
“otherwise consistent with” the ISDS treaty.12 This language clearly undermines the
exception and should be avoided in a carve-out for climate change action.
g. Disputes over scope of the carve-out
An important aspect of the uncertainty of state liabilities due to ISDS is the authority
of ISDS tribunals to interpret ISDS exceptions narrowly. Various cases indicate this
tendency of ISDS arbitrators.13

12
13

e.g. NAFTA, note 6 above, Article 1114.
Van Harten, note 2 above, 66-68.
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With this in mind, it is suggested that disputes over the applicability of a climate
change carve-out should be referred to a decision-making body that is established
under the auspices of a multilateral climate change agreement rather than an ISDS
treaty. Such a body would have greater expertise and institutional commitment to
ensure that the carve-out was interpreted to cover all forms of action reasonably
aimed at climate change mitigation or adaptation. By locating this interpretive
authority in a single body, uncertainties about varying or conflicting interpretations
among diverse ISDS tribunals would also be avoided.14
The language in the third paragraph of the carve-out aims to protect the exclusive
jurisdiction of this body under the multilateral climate change agreement. The
language is detailed and legalistic due to ISDS tribunals’ past record of taking
jurisdiction over ISDS disputes even in the face of, for example, an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in a related contract or a waiting period or fork-in-the-road clause
in an ISDS treaty.15
Beyond these points, questions about the body and process that should be used to
resolve disputes about the ISDS carve-out are more a matter for experts in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change than for ISDS experts.

G. Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 211, 237 and 245 (documenting
conflicting approaches by tribunals to, e.g., the ambiguous foreign investor right to ‘most-favourednation treatment’).
15 Van Harten, note 2 above, 135-150.
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